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I do not believe in our intelligentsia – hypocritical, false, hysterical, uneducated, lazy. 
I do not believe in it even when it suffers and complains, because its oppressors come 
from its own inner depths.
1
 
 
 
The soul of the Russian intelligentsia, like all of Russian life, is woven of contradictions, 
and it arouses contradictory feelings. It is impossible not to love it; it is impossible not to 
be repulsed by it.
2
 
 
 
 
Many scholars attempt to evaluate the condition of the Russian intelligentsia at 
the turn of the 20
th 
and 21
st 
century, as well as to answer what are the particular 
challenges that the intelligent faces in the modern Russia. The academic dispute on the 
intelligentsia has a long tradition in Russian historiography; yet, scholars still disagree on 
the meaning of the term intelligentsia and its origins. The debate is complicated as it 
traces the lot of a social group across two centuries, and thus has to acknowledge the 
ongoing social, political and economic change, not to mention the dramatic transformation 
of contemporary Russian cultural and intellectual life. The Russian intelligentsia has 
always shaped its values in response to the official ordo, while its worldview has been as 
much a function of the contemporary political system as it has 
been an outcome of intellectual development and autonomous creation. Consequently, the 
intelligentsia has been an entity which depends for its existence on the authoritarian state. 
Moreover, neither has the intelligentsia, nor the rest of the Russian society, experienced 
an extended period of democratic government, of free market economy, and of 
authority’s respect toward the human being. The policies of перестройка, гласность, 
1 Anton Chekhov in: Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution. New York, 1990, p. 140. 
2 
Sergei Bulgakov, “Heroism and Asceticism: Reflections on the Religious Nature of the Russian 
Intelligentsia” in: Nikolai A. Berdyaev ed., Landmarks: A Collection of Essays on the Russian 
Intelligentsia, 1909. New York, 1977, p. 62. 
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and ускорение, along with the events of the early 1990s shattered the world of the 
 
Russian intelligentsia. 
 
In this essay, I argue that the new principles of pluralism and free choice that 
emerged in all areas of life undermined the intelligentsia’s identity, revealed its multiple 
flaws, as well as forced intelligentsia to re-define its role. In the early 1990s, the 
intelligentsia encountered multiple new incentives in all realms: an ongoing democratic 
project with its opportunities for an open political activism, capitalism which mesmerized 
with easy gain, and finally, new intellectual and cultural trends of the Western world. 
What was missing was the all-encompassing state umbrella, which for so long helped the 
intelligentsia identify themselves, either for or against the власть. 
In my paper, I will investigate the condition of the Russian intelligentsia at the 
turn of the 21
st 
century. Let the title of Paul Gauguin’s painting, Where Do We Come 
From? What Are We? Where Are We Going?, be the Ariadne’s thread in the labyrinth of 
the scholarship on the contemporary Russian intelligentsia. Accordingly, I will first 
assess the question, Where Do We Come From?, and analyze how the traditional meaning 
of the term “intelligentsia” was transformed in the new reality. Then, I will examine the 
condition of the contemporary Russian intelligentsia by pointing out its major vices, 
which have been revealed over the period when intelligentsia has been grappling with the 
new chances and risks. Finally, I will pose the key question: Where Are We Going? I will 
discuss the projects of the role of the intelligentsia in the new political, social and cultural 
reality. There is no doubt that the principle of pluralism and the multiple opportunities 
that have emerged left intelligentsia in search for a firm identity and a new role, one that 
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would correspond to the new manifold reality, and that would also offer reliable points of 
reference. 
 
 
 
I, intelligent… 
 
First, in order to understand the condition of the contemporary Russian intelligent, 
one has to refer to the legacy of the Russian intelligentsia, from its first generation 
described by this term in the 1860s, to the Soviet intelligentsia of the late 20
th 
century. 
Notwithstanding controversies, almost all authorities would agree that the origins of the 
Russian intelligentsia go back to the “circles” of the 1830s and 1840s.3 It was a time 
when young intellectuals introduced into Russia new ideas in the form of German 
 
philosophical idealism. However, the term intelligentsia did not emerge in the Russian 
language until the 1860s, when it was proposed by Boborykin and became current. Some 
scholars see the roots of the 19
th 
century intelligentsia in the Petrine reforms, and 
Russia’s opening on Europe in the first half of the 18th century; others trace the 
 
intelligentsia’s origins back to the 18th century Russian nobility. 
What then was the Russian intelligentsia? The word has always had at least two 
overlapping uses: either all men who think independently or, more narrowly the 
intellectuals of the opposition, whether revolutionary or not.
4 
The Latin word 
intelligentsia means discernment, understanding, and intelligence, and the members of 
intelligentsia thought of themselves as the embodied “intelligence,” or “consciousness” 
of the nation. Consequently, they experienced a sense of apartness from the rest of the 
Russian population. Their social backgrounds were very diverse, as the intelligentsia 
 
 
3 
Martin Malia, “What Is the Intelligentsia?” in: Richard Pipes ed., The Russian Intelligentsia. New York, 
1961; p. 2. 
4 
Ibid. 
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came from all estates: the gentry, the merchantry, the clergy, and even the peasantry. It 
may seem that this melting pot of the intelligentsia would produce a sense of unity with 
their Russian compatriots, but in fact the intelligentsia alienated itself from the rest of 
Russian society.
5
 
The intelligentsia in the Soviet Union in its initial period tried to persuade the 
 
Bolshevik leaders to stop terror, yet the appeals of the Russian writers Maxim Gorky and 
Vladimir Korolenko to Lenin were unsuccessful. The new regime soon began repression 
against the “old” bourgeois intelligentsia, and stimulated creation of the “new 
intelligentsia” that consisted of people of certain social background. Subsequently, the 
character of the intelligentsia had been transformed, and it now consisted of technically 
trained personnel, whom Richard Pipes defines as semi-intelligentsia or “white collar”. In 
the following decades, many thousands of intelligentsia became victims of the Josef 
Stalin’s regime, even though many of them had previously made distinguished 
achievements in various areas of scientific and scholarly life, and in art and culture. 
Besides the persecuted part of the intelligentsia, there was also a part that actively 
collaborated with the state in the hope of promoting their careers. Krushchev’s cultural 
policy was contradictory: he united some cultural liberalization with the continuation of 
some repression. During the era of cultural Thaw, the Communist Party did not release 
culture from ideological control, but only extended the limits on the creativity of the 
intelligentsia. The Soviet regime never completely surrendered its ideological positions 
and continued the persecution of nonconformist intellectuals, i.e. in 1974, the renowned 
 
5 
More on the definition and etymology of the term intelligentsia in: Christopher Read, Culture and Power 
in Revolutionary Russia: The Intelligentsia and the Transition from Tsarism to Communism. New York, 
1990, pp. 1-38; Vladimir C. Nahirny, The Russian Intelligentsia: From Torment to Silence, p. 3-18. 
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writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn was forcibly deported from the Soviet Union. In the 
 
1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies caused liberalization of society, and diminishing of 
censorship what opened the press and mass media for political discussions. After a long 
break the intelligentsia had revived its influence on public opinion. The Soviet Union 
collapsed with the intelligentsia playing an important role in the destruction of the 
empire.
6
 
The multiple attempts to define the contemporary Russian intelligentsia relate to 
 
the classic understanding of intelligentsia as a unique group of society, which consists of 
educated people, artists, intellectuals and critically thinking individuals, many of whom 
remain in opposition to the government. One of the great contemporary Russian 
intellectuals, Dmitrii Likhachev, says that the intelligent is a “…человек бладающий 
умственной порядочностью, свободный в своих убеждениях, независящий от 
экономических, политических условий, неподчиняющийся идеологическим 
обязательствам”.
7
 
 
Scholars of the subject emphasize that the characteristic features of the intelligent 
now and in the past is his egotistic stand and yearning to attract the attention of the world 
around him. Renowned academic Andrei Siniavskii discusses this ultimate self-conceit of 
the contemporary intelligentsia in his book The Russian Intelligentsia, and he 
purposefully uses letter я (what in Russian means “I”) in the title of his book in order to 
underline this trend. Siniavskii states, “Наша интеллигенция, к сожалению, слишком 
часто склонна к экстремизму, истерической эмоциональности, (…) лишь бы люди, 
 
 
6 
Andrei Siniavskii, The Russian Intelligentsia. New York, 1997. 
http://www.answers.com/topic/intelligentsia 
7 
Dmitrii Likhachev in: Sergei Filatov ed. Kongress rossiiskoi intelligentsii: Moskva, 10-11 dekabria 1997; 
p. 19. 
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наконец, заметили это маленькое, столь дорогое каждому его собвственное Я.”8 
 
This egotistic inclination is also addressed by Vitalii Kurennyi, who argues that the 
Russian intelligent of the 19
th 
century defined himself in opposition to state authority, and 
the Soviet period had only prolonged this trend.
9 
Consequently, the contemporary 
Russian authority, which neither prosecutes nor spoils the members of the intelligentsia, 
is a shock for an intelligent, who was used to being in the center of attention. For him to 
be ignored is even more bitter than to be prosecuted. 
Yet another feature of the contemporary intelligentsia is revealed in the distinction 
between intelligent and intellectual, which for the first time has become explicit. So far, 
there has been little discussion of the differences between the two groups, and the terms 
“intelligentsia” and “intellectuals” have been used interchangeably when referring to 
writers, poets, and other creative professions.
10 
The contemporary academic discussion 
revolves around Max Weber’s “ideal types” categories and defines “intelligentsia” as a 
community of educated members from a variety of social strata, who are concerned with 
their own social standing. The “intellectuals”, on the other hand, is a small group of people 
of high creativity, who are often characterized by more individualistic stances.
11  
Both 
groups are parts of a complex cultural mechanism, in 
which the intelligentsia breaks down and elucidates the ideas raised by the intellectuals. 
 
Everyday language confuses both categories, and even some of the men of letters 
themselves offer contradictory interpretations of term “intellectuals.” Landau, who is a 
 
 
 
8 Ibid; p. 48. 
9 
Vitalii Kurennyi, “Intellektualy” in: Vitalii Kurennyi ed. Myshlashaya Rossiia: kartografiia 
sovremennykh intellektualnykh napravlenii. Moskov 2006; p. 15. 
10 Alexei Elfimov, Russian Intellectual Culture in Transition: The Future in the Past. London 2003; p. 20. 
11 
Vitalii Kurennyi, “Intellektualy” in: Vitalii Kurennyi ed. Mysliashchaia Rossiia: kartografiia 
sovremennykh intellektualnykh napravlenii; p. 6. 
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well-known Russian theater critic, defines intellectuals in a pejorative mode when she 
claims that the threat for the contemporary intelligentsia is that it can be transformed into 
“the ethically indifferent intellectuals.”12 Yet other authors take a completely opposite 
approach, and argue that the word “intellectual” has recently had more favorable 
connotations, because it now refers to professionals, “like those in the West, who 
accomplish something, unlike members of the Russian intelligentsia, who talk on and on 
about nothing.”13 Last, but not least, there is a recognition among some scholars, that the 
era of the intellectuals have not yet come in Russia, “…the intellectuals in the true sense, 
who advocate certain philosophical principles, discern connections between many 
disciplines, and make their observations known to society at large, virtually do not exist in 
contemporary Russia.”14 
The above discussion of the emergence of the category “intellectual” in the sphere 
 
reserved for so long for the intelligentsia exclusively relates to other differentiations of the 
contemporary Russian intelligentsia. First of all, it has been a recent development to 
investigate the intelligentsia by taking either an axiological or a sociological approach. 
Accordingly, in the case of the former approach, one examines intelligentsia as a group of 
people, who are not only well-educated and cultured, but who also have a strong sense of 
moral principles. Consequently, the priority of this group, besides professional interests 
and talents, is the moral responsibility for fellow citizens, society, and humanity. In the 
sociological approach, one treats intelligentsia as mass social strata, which plays an 
important role in the functioning of the societal institutions. Therefore, this group is 
 
 
12 Simona Landau. …Ne daët otveta. Moskva, 2007; p. 84. 
13 
Heyward Isham ed, Russia's fate through Russian eyes: voices of the new generation. Boulder, 2001; p. 
331. 
14 
Ibid. 
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interested in improving its own social standing and fulfilling its professional duties, 
rather than disseminating certain moral values.
15
 
Some scholars go to great lengths to classify the contemporary Russian 
intelligentsia, and they identify three distinct groups and label them as moralists, white- 
collar workers, and managers.
16 
All the splits are no doubt an effect of the pressure of 
new socio-political circumstances, in which defining who is and who is not an intelligent 
is not so easy. One has to agree with the Russian scholar Tatiana Naumova that: 
В недавнем прошлом отечественную интеллигенцию в целом характеризовало 
определенное единство социокультурных и политических ориентаций. В 
результате радыкальных перемен в среде интеллигенции (…) произошел ее раскол 
между различными силами, борющимися за разные пути развития России.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seven deadly sins 
 
The new model of pluralism in politics and culture challenges the intelligentsia to 
respond to the multiplied voices and opinions that have been formed on the side of the 
formerly “mono- factors”: nation and authority. This process reveals the intelligentsia’s 
deeply rooted vices and its new flaws forming a catalog of the intelligentsia’s seven 
deadly sins. At the turn of the 21
st 
century, the Russian intelligentsia shares some of its 
19
th 
century predecessors’ faults, such as: alienation from the people, disinterest in the 
 
intellectual profession, lack of interest in maintaining moral values, and utopian idealism. 
Additionally, this catalog is supplemented with a new set of vices, among them 
corruption with money and power, abandonment (исход) of its traditional social tasks, as 
 
well as a pronounced sense of helplessness of the former homo sovieticus. While the later 
 
 
15 A.A. Yudin ed., Obrazovannyi sloi Rossii: vremia peremen, Nizhnyi Novgorod, 2002; p. 31. 
16 Ibid; p. 55. 
17 
Tatiana Naumova, Nauchnaia intelligentsiia v novoi Rossii. Moskva, 2008; p.71. 
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faults are a development of the past two decades, the former flaws characterized the 
intelligentsia in the early 20
th 
century and had been discussed by the authors of Vekhi 
(Landmarks), a seminal collection of essays by Russian thinkers, published in 1909. 
None of the works on the Russian intelligentsia make sense without the context of 
Vekhi, in which Nikolai Berdyaev, Sergei Bulgakov, Mikhail Gershenzon, Aleksandr 
Izgoev, Bogdan Kistyakovsky, Pyotr Struve and Semen Frank offer their explanation of 
the Russian intelligentsia’s roots, its disintegration and ultimate failure. Among the variety 
of reasons contributing to the certain outlook of the 19
th 
century Russian intelligentsia, a 
few are essential to the aforementioned authors: intelligentsia’s alienation from the people; 
its dissociation with science, art and religion; inclination toward martyrdom; and finally, 
an individual psychological crisis. Although each of the authors investigates the role of a 
certain factor in the intelligentsia’s life such as: philosophy, 
ascetism, law, self-cognition, education, revolution, ethics, they sometimes present a 
similar critique of the intelligentsia. That makes Landmarks a fascinating analysis of the 
failure of the Russian intelligentsia at the turn of the 20
th 
century. 
The question of alienation from the people is a leitmotif in the history of the 
 
Russian intelligentsia, and is again actual in the contemporary Russia. The popular model 
used by scholars assumes a triangle as a symbol of relations between the state authority, 
the people, and intelligentsia, every one of which is placed on the respective apex of this 
triangle. The role of the intelligentsia in this model is to represent the “dark”, oppressed 
people to the authority. One asks whether it is viable for the intelligentsia to maintain the 
same distance to the two other factors in this symbolic triangle, and at the same time 
successfully represent only one of the agents, the people. The modern Russian 
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intelligentsia for a long time has carried on the mistaken perception of being close to the 
people and acting in the name of the people. In the long run, the intelligentsia elitist 
approach to the people, and its desire to lead the “dark mass” has made the intelligentsia 
similar to the authority. According to a scholar, Vladimir Меzhуеv, “Понятие 
интеллигента относится к человеку, для которово его уникальная и неповтаримая 
индивидуальность существует в оппозиции к безликой, этически однородной массе 
лишенной индивидуальных признаков.”
18 
How then, given this tradition, can the 
 
intelligent release himself from this tragic misunderstanding and relate to the 
contemporary polymorphous structure of society and its individualistic character? 
The contemporary Russian intelligent’s sense of alienation is intensified, because 
he has difficulties coming to terms with the new social reality, with the ongoing process 
of Westernization, with consumerism and popular culture, with his compatriots visiting 
foreign countries, searching for information on radio, TV and internet. The reality puts 
the intelligent in a dramatic situation, when his monopoly for knowledge and information 
breaks, and when he ceases to be the exclusive and desirable source of knowledge for the 
“dark mass.” The intellectual monopoly of the intelligentsia is being replaced with 
alienation, as every Russian man is capable of thinking for himself and making political 
and social choices without asking anyone for advice. 
The negative heritage of the intelligentsia is also visible in its contemporary 
attitude toward its professional duties. This approach is often similar to what Gershenzon 
discussed, when he claimed in Vekhi that in its eagerness to fulfill a political role, the 
intelligentsia has spent half a century at the square, wailing and bandying angry word 
 
 
18 
V.N. Mezhyev in: A. Guseinov ed. Svobodnoe slovo: intellektual’naia khronika desiatiletiia, 1985-1995; 
p.304. 
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about, and staying away from any serious intellectual activity.
19 
Currently, in some 
professions it is not easy for the intelligent to be a devoted employee. In case of 
academia, the obvious reasons for crisis are scarcity of financial resources, 
bureaucratization and disorganization. In order to adjust to the new situation the 
contemporary academic has to go through the rite of passage, “…from the private space 
of the kitchen to the public space of the scientific institution, [that] leads to an automatic 
switching from ‘reflection in general’ to stereotyped professional discourse.”20 Good for 
him! – one may think, the professional discourse is what people expect the intelligent to 
be engaged in. 
However, even in the sphere of professional discourse, the intelligent is often 
bound to fail, as the sphere of professional life has been transformed according to the 
principles of plurality and diversity. An academic is almost overnight forced to overcome 
his own intellectual disorientation which follows the collapse of communism; 
simultaneously, he gets confused with the new Western ideas, which are flooding 
Russia.
21 
The unexpected triumph of the alternative culture and hidden intellectual life 
 
confuses the intelligent. Yet meanwhile, changing socio-economic conditions place the 
intelligent under a pressure, so it oftentimes happens that he decides to launch his own 
business or simply struggle for the family’s survival instead of participating in the 
intellectual and professional exchange. The outcome is that the intellectual dialogue 
silences, and some of the professional responsibilities are abandoned due to the search for 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
Mikhail Gershenzon, “Creative Self-Recognition” in: Nikolai A. Berdyaev ed., Landmarks: A Collection 
of Essays on the Russian Intelligentsia, 1909, p. 79 
20 H. Isham ed, Russia's fate through Russian eyes: voices of the new generation; p. 331. 
21 
Ibid; p. 336. 
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better opportunities offered by the new reality, as well as due to the inability to adjust to a 
new multidimensional intellectual discourse. 
The utopian idea about a special vocation of the Russian intelligentsia belongs to 
its traditional sins, and even today in the new reality of plural, more democratic political 
and cultural discourse, the intelligentsia’s bent to assume the messianic role is apparent. 
In Russia, the discussion of the intelligentsia, or rather of its ideal type, has always 
revolved around such lofty ideas as moral imperative, which led to defining the 
intelligentsia in terms of some divine spiritual qualities. Dmitrii Likhachev states, 
“Интеллигент-это состояние души.”
22 
A scholar of intelligentsia, Ergin, in his article, 
 
“Реализует ли себя российская интеллигенция?”, maintains the myth of its special 
mission, “В России интеллигенция как носитель духовного начала почти 
единственный слой способный сохранять в обществе моральное начало.”23 Landau 
shares his opinion about the unique character and sacred vocation of the intelligentsia, 
when she states, “А миссия хранить и взращивать доброе полодоносные зерна всегда 
лежала и лежит (…) на русской интеллигенции.”24 The utopian rhetoric is also well 
expressed by Glukhova, “…Главная миссия интеллигенции состоит в том, чтобы 
выражать духовные интересы целого, чтобы в каждой данной ситуации найти ту 
позицию, которая представляет наилучшую возможность.”25 Lucky the one who can 
live up to this postulate… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 V.E. Triodin, Sudba rossiiskoi intelligentsii: materialy nauchnoi diskussii. Sankt-Petersburg, 1999; p.35. 
23 
E.A.Ergin in: Sergei Poltorak ed., Fenomen rossiiskoi intelligentsii: istoriia i psikhologiia: materialy 
mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, 24-25 maia 2000, Sankt-Peterburg. p.72. 
24 Simona Landau. …Ne daët otveta. 
25 
E. Glukhova in: V.P.Etisov ed., Rossiia nakanune XXI veka: novye vekhi: materialy mezhvuzovskoi 
nauchnoi konferentsii 2-3 fevralia 1999. p. 18. 
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Yet, along with these utopian postulates, there is a widespread recognition that the 
intelligentsia is in fact disinterested in maintaining moral standards and in disseminating 
certain values in Russia. In the Russian tradition the intelligent has been identified as the 
conscience of the nation, the Dostoevsky type who refuses the world where a suffering of 
a child is permitted. This stand resembles ideas of some Western philosophers, such as 
Manheim or Nietzsche who emphasize the role of the intelligentsia in the improving 
moral condition of the nation. Currently, some of the Russian scholars refer either 
directly or indirectly to these models and claim that there is no future for the people, if 
the intelligentsia does not start to work on its own moral improvement. 
The sad picture of the weak moral condition is confirmed by the surveys of the 
contemporary Russian intelligentsia, in which its members respond to the questions about 
their values and concerns. In the years 1993-1998, the number of the intelligentsia willing 
to strengthen the moral principles in social life has sharply decreased.
26 
The decrease of 
engagement is also to be observed in such areas as: strengthening of the rules of law and 
order (31% in 1993, 24% in 1998), securing the rights of man (29%, 18% respectively), 
or striving for the development of the nation (49%, 13% respectively).
27 
According to the 
 
survey, the so-called соль земли has partially lost its interest in fulfilling its traditional 
role of the moral leader, and social reforms do not play an important role in their 
worldview any more. The majority of intelligentsia prefers to define its social tasks 
primary in terms of spiritual, intellectual and professional work, rather than civic or 
political practice. 
 
 
 
 
26 A.A. Yudin ed., Obrazovannyi sloi Rossii: vremia peremen, p. 30. 
27 
Ibid, p. 30. 
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A high number of the intelligentsia has become much more restrained in playing 
the role of the spiritual leader, and has withdrawn into private sphere. The social 
disengagement of intelligentsia is evident, even though there is still a lot of wishful 
thinking about its moral quality, “…Можно было бы говорить о роли интеллигенции 
в качестве носителя, хранителя и субъекта развития гуманитарной культуры.”28 
This statement is sharply contrasted with Professor Alexei Nikishnekov’s picture of the 
 
intelligentsia, “An intellectual of yesterday in Russia was a type perfectly shaved and 
occasionally drunk; whereas an intellectual of today is a type occasionally shaved and 
perfectly drunk.”29 
Among the cardinal sins of the intelligentsia one can also find corruption with 
 
power and money, a phenomenon called by Siniavsky “dollarization of consciousness”, 
and one that is broadly discussed in studies on the contemporary Russian intelligentsia. 
The problem of the intelligentsia craving for power is not new in the literature, and many 
interesting interpretations are offered by scholars, among them Richard Pipes’ analysis in 
his book The Russian Revolution (1990). According to Pipes, the 19
th 
century Russian 
intelligentsia may be defined as intellectuals craving for political power, who for a long 
time had remained in permanent opposition to the autocracy, only to push the rest of the 
population to revolution in 1917. It is not difficult to recognize similar trends in the 
critique of the contemporary intelligentsia, “Ныне многих интеллигентов объяла 
страсть, прямо-таки потребность соединиться с властью, самими стать властью.”30 
This inclination became explicit in the early 1990’s, when academics, writers, engineers, 
 
 
 
 
28 V.E. Triodin, Sudba rossiiskoi intelligentsii: materialy nauchnoi diskussii; p. 91. 
29 Alexei Elfimov, Russian Intellectual Culture in Transition : The Future in the Past; p. 108. 
30 
V.N. Mexhyev in: A. Guseinov ed. Svobodnoe slovo: intellektualnaia khronika desiatiletiia, 1985-1995; 
p.306. 
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and artists frantically searched for governmental positions. In the new political situation, 
with an imperfect Russian democracy, some members of the intelligentsia became 
disinterested in the role of opposing to the authority and representing the people, and 
some of its members concentrated efforts on pursuing the sheer power. In this tendency 
the intelligentsia resembled Robespierre, who launched his political career protesting 
against the death penalty. 
In the same time, the intelligentsia was not required by the average citizen, who 
made his political choices autonomously; that was yet another incentive for the intelligent 
to move toward the other apex of the triangle, the authority. Needless to say, when 
granted an office, the intelligent in power happened to be a complete failure. His 
detachment from the real life was detrimental to his work, “На государственных постах 
любой грамотный чиновник в тысячу раз полезнее краснобайствующего и 
идеологически ангажированного интеллигента.”31 Some scholars recognized the 
intelligent at power as an antinomy, something that goes against the tradition of the 
intelligentsia. Last but not least, others pointed out the risk involved in the intelligentsia 
at power, and providing historical evidence, they warned of “ideocracy”, the dictatorship 
of ideas. 
The intelligentsia, having failed in its attempts to find own place and collaborate 
with either the people or the authority, has partially withdrawn from the social and 
political life, and distanced itself from both sides. This act of withdrawal could have 
various forms. Some members of the intelligentsia took advantage of the free market 
economy and launched a new business, some, having been seduced by the foreign 
professional offers, emigrated; yet others chose an internal exile. Whether one was an 
31 
Ibid, p. 319. 
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actor of the brain drain process, or he thrived as a businessman, a nouveau riche, it was 
evident that the challenges and diverse opportunities of the new system had an 
overwhelming influence on the intelligentsia. 
The principle of political, economic and cultural diversity effected the intelligent 
in a variety of forms, one of which describes Dmitrii Bykov, a Moscow writer: 
Стихи я пишу, когда пишется. Чаще всего сочиняю их в транспорте или во время 
прогулки с собокой. Прозу пишу по выходным. А на жизнь заработываю статями 
которые постепенно эту жизнь заменили, вытеснив из неё выпивку, агюльтеры, 
дружеские посиделки и общественную активность.32 
 
Probably, to a higher degree than it was in the case of the other citizens, the intelligent 
was disoriented in this new situation, and, while for the first time in life given so many 
opportunities, he often decided to withdraw from his traditional position into other 
spheres. The intelligentsia was both blessed and cursed with the old Chinese saying, 
“Shall you live in interesting times.” 
Finally, this long list of sins ends with the intelligentsia’s inability to fit into the 
new post-Soviet reality and its inclination to dwell into the past, when the state 
constituted one and only point of reference. The contemporary intelligentsia subscribes to 
all-Russian phenomenon of homo sovieticus, with its helplessness, extreme confusion and 
inability to find its own place in a reality that ceased to be the state-driven monolith. 
Strikingly, despite its position in the “triangular model”, the intelligentsia does not refer 
to the third apex -”the people,” as it did in the past two centuries. Consequently, one may 
think that the principle of the people has been an excuse for the intelligentsia to negotiate 
its own position with the authority. Zapesetskii states, “Неудивительно что любой 
разговор о роли интеллигенции в общественном развитии непременно переходит в 
 
32 
Dmitrii Bykov, Vmesto zhizni. Moscow, 2006, cover. 
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разговор об отношениях интеллигенции с властью.”33 It is the curse of the 
intelligentsia that it has constructed its identity against the vlast’, and as a result, now it 
suffers from the change in the character of the state authority and the nature of its own 
connection to it. 
 
 
 
Что делать? 
 
The above list of the intelligentsia’s sins poses a question about its future in the 
modern Russia, as well as its ability to construct and negotiate a status in the new reality 
characterized by principles of plurality and free choice. The position of intelligentsia is 
one not to be envied, as it describes Naumova, “…интеллигенция сама оказалась 
жертвой преобразований, к которым она стремилась, обосновывая их 
необходимость, и за которые боролась.”34 The intelligentsia, being both shocked and 
disillusioned with the reforms that have transformed the social, political and cultural 
reality of Russia, is now forced to reevaluate its own role. The problem is that the 
intelligentsia, along with its mission, means all things to all people. Therefore, any 
attempt to satisfy the postulates of certain groups is always met with critique from some 
other social actors. 
Given its position in the aforementioned model of a triangle, the intelligentsia has 
three alternatives: either it will successfully fulfill its social agenda by building 
connections between the poli-structures of the authority and the people, it will withdraw 
from the triangle to pursue its own personal and professional goals, or, finally, it will not 
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decide on either of the above and will suffer a complete failure. As one may expect, there 
is much discussion on the future of the intelligentsia in academic and popular circles in 
Russia. Much of this can be easily analyzed in the three models of the future of 
intelligentsia: symbolic death, action limited by realistic agenda, submerging into utopian 
projects. 
The most dramatic scenario, the complete failure, which is sometimes called the 
symbolic death, follows logic of one of the famous Russian writers Daniil Granin, who in 
a prolific article in 1997 announced that the Russian intelligentsia perishes.
35 
Later, he 
confirmed this opinion in set of articles, “Интеллигенция тает на глазах. […] 
Талантливая научная молодежь уезжает за границу. Кто не уезжает, подаётся в 
коммерцию. Меняют профессии, уходят из сферы интеллектуального труда, чтобы 
выжить.”36 Another author, Masha Gessen, in her book, Dead Again: The Russian 
Intelligentsia after Communism, investigates the faiths of several Russian intelligents, to 
conclude that the intelligentsia, due to the lack of unifying values, had already expired.
37
 
The moral and ideological vacuum is a crucial factor, which contributes to a gradual 
 
devastation of the intelligentsia’s potential. One of the scholars, Vladimir Mirzoev states, 
“The main problem of Russian intelligentsia today is that it has no obvious cultural- 
anthropological ideal it finds essential to affirm.”38 Consequently, not only does the 
intelligentsia perish because of the worsening social position and living standard, but it is 
also weakened by the poignant awareness of the state disinteressment in its faith, as well 
as by lack of the unifying principle. 
 
35 Daniil Granin. “Rossiskaia intelligentsia ukhodit”, in: Russika-Izvestia, November 5, 1997. 
36 D. Granin in: V.E. Triodin, Sudba rossiiskoi intelligentsii: materialy nauchnoi diskussii; p. 55. 
37 Masha Gessen, Dead Again: The Russian Intelligentsia after Communism. New York, 1997. 
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One of the most conspicuous signs of the withering of the intelligentsia may be 
the unwillingness of some of its apparent members to define themselves by this term. 
Russian late historian, Lev Gumilev, burst with anger when he was called an intelligent, 
“Я - образованный человек и уже поэтому не интеллигент. Я – солдат, я – Родину 
защищал. А интеллигенты – это те,  кто языком болтают.”39 He confirmed his 
negative opinion about the intelligentsia, when he stated that it was easier to deceive 
intelligentsia than it was to deceive the people, because the former was senseless. 
40
 
Similarly, Professor Alexei Nikishenkov, a popular figure in the humanities at Moscow 
 
State University, says that he does not want to be associated with the intelligentsia 
anymore.
41
 
Moreover, even the young generation of the Russian intelligentsia renounces this 
title similarly to the elderly professors. Aleksandr Saltykov, a former graduate student at 
Moscow State University, now working for a private Russian –American firm, states, “I 
would rather be associated with the New Russian today, than with the intellectuals; the 
former say little but at least get some work done, while the latter say much and do 
nothing. […] so you has better stay the hell away from this weird group.”
42 
His colleague, 
 
Olga Vainshtein, a young professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities, 
distances herself from the tradition of the intelligentsia and refuses to play the role of 
metaphorical Prometheus. She says, “Our humanities people should finally abandon this 
idea, long cultivated in this society, of striving after the position of the genuine organic 
intelligentsia, some omnicompetent teachers of the nation, and just learn to pursue a 
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40 Ibid; p. 69. 
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normal critically oriented academic discourse.”43 As a result, when people whom one 
would define as the intelligentsia start to contest the abnormal status of this group and do 
not want to be associated with it, the intelligentsia really comes much closer to death. 
Gloria victis… 
Yet, at the same time, there are some, who, having read Weber and Nietzsche, 
warn, that the destruction of the intelligentsia can lead to the lethal consequences for the 
entire nation. In order to avoid this path they offer realistic agendas for the intelligentsia. 
Scholars recognize that intelligentsia will remain in the tupik, as long as it does not 
redefine its role in the triangular model, “Пока данная ситуация не изменимая, судьба 
будет повтаряшься: либо быть жертвой, страдающей за весь народ, либо 
развращаться властью и пополнять ряды плутокрации.”
44 
The situation is 
 
complicated, yet there is a chance to find a satisfying solution. Daga claims, “…Сегодня 
интеллигенция обречена на мучительную агонию и незбежную гибель в течение 
ближайших 2 -3 десятилетий; однако таки исход не фатален.”45 Among multiple 
ideas on the role and place of the intelligentsia, one can find some viable and well-argued 
postulates, such as: to resign from the role of a moral guru on behalf of a more practical 
activity, choose the tasks that correlate to the present needs, enhance constructive 
differentiation among the group, develop an awareness of a national intelligentsia and, 
finally, drop the politics of total condemnation of the government on behalf of 
constructive criticism. There is something to be done… 
 
Mezhyev calls for a reform in the intelligentsia’s attitude toward the people, 
 
“Надо, стало быть отношение интеллигенции к народу заменить отношением 
 
 
43 Ibid; p. 107. 
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индивида к индивиду, то есть подлинно человеческим отношением.”46 That is, in 
other words, the intelligentsia is asked to step back from the altar, and rethink its sacred 
position. Currently, there is a need for both: the intelligentsia pursuing moral chastity, but 
also making practical socio-political choices, “То есть выбор связан с тем, чтобы в 
конечном итоге более активно и всесторонне влиять на общественное развитие, на 
становление нашего демократического общества.”47 Only in this way can the 
intelligentsia avoid the mistake of its 19
th 
century predecessors, described in Vekhi. 
 
This opinion is followed with a postulate to acknowledge the reality, and form the 
intelligentsia’s agenda in reference to it, rather than base it on some utopian principles. 
The tradition of the долг to the people, introduced to Russian political thought by Petr 
Tkachev, is yet another example of an unproductive rhetoric. Rather than continue it, the 
intelligentsia should pursue some realistic tasks, among them: revival of society, political 
and cultural development, supporting the civil society, enhancing dialogue between the 
authority and nation. Once again, these are only words, but a smart intelligent is capable of 
pursuing these goals, if only willing to. The nestor of the Russian intelligentsia, 
Dmitrii Likhachev, at the Congress of the Russian Intelligentsia in 1997, appealed for the 
intelligentsia’s engagement into a positivist project, for help to the libraries, museums, and 
other local and national institutions, which were going through a tough time.
48 
The 
aforementioned Congress introduced “The Declaration of the Cultural Rights”, which is 
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one step toward better definition of the potential intelligentsia’s contribution to the 
cultural life of the contemporary Russia.
49
 
In contrary to the voices mourning over the diffusion of the intelligentsia, many 
scholars believe that there is much to be gained in this process. They approve of the 
differentiation of dysfunctional intelligentsia, because it contributes to the emergence of 
the productive professional group of intellectuals. This process of differentiation is 
accompanied with the urge to reestablish the self-awareness of the Russian intelligentsia. 
Scholars, referring to the intelligentsia’s indebtedness to the Western tradition, call for 
formation of a national intelligentsia, one that would be independent of the foreign trends, 
or at least critical in their application. It is high time for the intelligentsia to abandon once 
and forever the rhetoric along the lines “Умом Россию не понять..”, and make an effort 
to understand one’s own country in order to come up with a plan for improvement. The 
intelligentsia has to bind itself closer to the native land, if it does not want to be 
completely alienated and left outside the national life. 
Finally, the difficulty of the intelligentsia’s political stance is an effect of its 
uneasy position as a negotiator between two sides, the authority and the people, whose 
interests have been in conflict for centuries. Currently, at the cradle of the Russian 
democracy, intelligentsia can be neither the authority’s pet nor its servant, yet it cannot 
also prolong its own policy of total criticism of the authority. Davelov says: 
…Интеллигенции пора отказаться от положения гордого оппонента, критически 
взирающего на любые действия власти, перестать лелеять фешизированный образ 
народа, […] а перейти к реальной, практической работе: непосредственному 
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сотрудничеству с властью в плане разработки новой идеологии и посредством 
такой – позитивному воздействию на общественное сознание.50 
 
Whether one approves or not of the policies of the Russian government, its total 
condemnation is a position taken by an intellectual sluggard, who prefers the century- 
long formulas over new intellectual contribution. 
In this reformist rush, it is easy to cross the line of realistic agenda and, 
 
continuing the well-established Russian intellectual tradition, resolved to wishful thinking 
and in the projects of the intelligentsia’s future lapse into the sphere of utopia. Among 
many irrational projections of the role of the intelligentsia in the present and future of 
Russia, three trends are recognizable: unrelenting rhetoric about the “chosen”, “Messianic” 
role of the intelligentsia, dreams about unity between the intelligentsia and authority, and 
various plans characterized by inner paradoxes and contradictions. 
In some circles, the idea that the intelligentsia deserves special treatment still 
holds strong, notwithstanding the political and social transformation the country has 
come through. Glukhova states, “В демократическом обществе нормативный 
консенсус может установиться лишь в результате широкой общественной 
дискусии, где особая роль принадлежит интелигенции.”
51 
On the one hand, thanks to 
 
the existence of these ideals, members of the intelligentsia can pursue goals that have 
been previously enumerated. On the other hand, though, these principles act against the 
well-being of the intelligentsia, as they once again separate it from the society, and place 
the intelligentsia on a mystique altar hovering over the heads of average citizens. 
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Certain Russian scholars postulate unification of the intelligentsia and the state 
authority, taking away from the intelligentsia the choice to either participate in politics as 
an actor, or to continue a constructive critique of the governmental policy. Zapesotskii 
observes that it is the intelligentsia’s mission to unite politics with morals, which, 
especially in the 21
st 
century, seems to be but an irrational project that can be put on the 
shelf next to the 19
th 
century “going-to-the-people” movement. Similar postulates are to 
 
be understood in terms of propaganda, when they are expressed by people like 
Abdulatipov, a former vice-premier of the Russian government, who argues against what 
he calls an artificial split between government and the intelligentsia. Instead, he offers a 
unification, saying, “Настоящие величие России и российских граждан зависит от 
единства власти и интеллигенции.”52 One shall be cautious of this kind of union, as it 
would make the intelligentsia vulnerable to the government’s policies. 
Last but not least, the plans considering the future of the Russian intelligentsia are 
often marked by internal incongruence and do not offer viable solutions. This even 
applies to the mandarins of the Russian thought and their conceptions, as in the case of 
Likhachev, who spoke on the topic during the aforementioned Congress. In his speech, 
Likhachev argues against mono-ideology for the intelligentsia, as he sees “diversity” as its 
major value. Additionally, he claims that individualism is condition sine qua non for the 
existence of the intelligent, and any attempt to curtail this individualism by means of party 
organization would be detrimental to the intelligentsia. However, Likhachev concludes 
with a paradox when he introduces the aforementioned “positivist project” and offers the 
declaration to be signed by the members of the Congress, calling upon the 
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intelligentsia to coordinate their efforts along certain “party” lines. The above is one of 
many examples of the inconsistency of potential reformers and leaders of the 
intelligentsia. It is probably a forgivable however, given the complexity of the 
intelligentsia’s condition of diversity. 
Ralf Dahrendorf claims that societies without intellectuals are devoid of future. 
Today’s Russia needs intellectuals; whether or not it needs the intelligentsia is a question 
of the near future. At this point, even the scholars working on the subject of the Russian 
intelligentsia are confused and uncertain of its future. Furthermore, the studies of the 
intelligentsia itself have been stained with the clash between the mono-system of the past 
and the new poli-structures. In his discussion of the research on the intelligentsia, 
Sibiryakov states: 
Одним из возможных вариантов преодоления ‘кризиса’ интеллигентоведения 
может стать реализация знаменитого принципа ‘дополнительности’ Н. Бора, суть 
которого можна было бы свести к следующей формуле: ни одна концепция не 
может описать объект столь исчерпывающим образом, что бы ислючить 
возможность существования других концепции.53 
 
It would be pointless to argue that the Soviet period was a black and white reality, 
with Manichean distinction between good and evil. However, we can make the claim that 
there was surely much less room for the individual decision. Under the Soviet rule, it 
might have been easier for the intelligent to stick to his identity, define himself against 
the authority, and find a goal in his life, which had been often limited to the sphere of “a 
room and a half.” Bogatsyrin says, “Интеллигент был более активен и целеустремлен 
когда в стране был идеологический диктат, а когда его не стало, то он как-то вроде 
27  
растерялся и потерял идейный ориентир.”54 The intelligentsia, having been both 
impelled and lured by the new principles, has not yet completely answered the questions, 
Where Do We Come From? What Are We? Where Are We Going? Neither did the 
scholars. 
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